The European banking system is not isomorphic. The differences can be traced to the differences in their local economy development, legal origin, ownership status, corporate governance system, etc. The 2008 crisis has found the banking system of Europe in a transition status. The adoption of Euro, the establishment of the European Central Bank, the Basil III initiative, the adoption of legal isomorphism as policy in E.U., and finally the crises have been creating a unique environment for the banking system. The paper will address the issue of convergence of the banking system in Europe using a set of data from 27 countries of Europe. The analysis shows that the banks haven't changed their financial and ownership structure. Some changes in strategy are not adequate to formulate the opinion that the banking sector in Europe is different than the one before it.
Introduction
The paper is a first approach to a research program that emphasizes in studying the main differences of the banking system of Europe, its characteristics and particularities. The paper will present the historical evolution of the banking system and analyze the main drivers this evolution.
During the last decade a great number of events have forced the banking system in Europe to transform, to adapt to a new financial, economic, political and social environment. Two financial crisis, (2001-2002 and 2008-2009) , two voluntary attempts to voluntary regulate the financial system (Basel II and III), the introduction of the Euro and the establishment of the European Central Bank, several regulation attempts to create an isomorphic legal environment (Lazarides 2011 (Lazarides , 2010 , financial scandals of [2001] [2002] 2008 and the globalization of the financial sector are some the events that created a new environment for the financial sector.
Whether these changes have created enough momentum to change the basic differences that Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have noted (orientation, ownership concentration and time horizon of economic relationships) and whether these changes will lead to an isomorphic and more financially stable banking system is the research questions of the paper.
Data and Approach
The data were collected from Bankscope. The data cover the period from 2004 to 2011, the twenty seven (27) European Union countries and the only commercial and cooperative banks. The total number of banks collected was 4.573. After the analysis of outliers the sample was reduced to 4.536 banks (2.873 active and 1.663 inactive).
The data were compiled using two different dimensions: a) location and b) time. The location dimension was analyzed into three categories: a) PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), b) North -South (Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Malta), c) corporate governance system (Anglo-Saxon system: United Kingdom, Cyprus, Malta, and Continental Europe). The time dimension was analyzed into three categories: a) last year of data (2011 or the adoption of Basel III accord), b) the average of the last three (3) years , the time period after the 2008 crises) and c) the average of the last eight (8) years or the adoption of Basel II accord).
The selection of the categories is not arbitrary. It is based on the questions that are posed by economists, policy makers and researchers. The main questions are: a) did the Basel accord contribute to risk mitigation? b) Are there fundamental differences between the banking systems of Europe? c) Is there a convergence -divergence trend?
The Banking System of Europe before the crises of 2008
The banking system of Europe has gone through two decades of turbulence. Through the 1990's a wave of mergers, liquidations and bankruptcies has swept the sector. This wave was at its peak the last years of the 1990's and the 2000-2004 period. Since then the number of exits form the sector has been relatively stable (see Figure 1 ). It is notable that the cooperative banks suffered more than the commercials. This fact can be attributed to their smaller size, ownership structure, management efficiency, etc.
Figure 1. Inactive Banks

Source: Bankscope
The analysis of the exits form the sector (see Figure  2) shows that the majority of the exits are caused by mergers. Bankruptcies take place in three distinctive periods (1999-2002, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012) . These periods are the same with the ones that scandals or crises take place, and they must be direct or indirect result of these failures (in regulation, ethics, corporate governance, risk management, financial management, etc.). To elaborate on the climate and expectations of the market during this period a numerical ranking of the ranking scale of Fitch has been drafted (see Table  1 ) in order to compare the rankings and to create an overall index of the market's expectation of the banks didn't manage to adapt to the new environment or their strategy to the challenges of the market was to seek safety in size and in cooperation with other banks. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the vast majority of the banks that were merged or dissolved, were single location banks (meaning that the smaller banks in equity and capital were the targets for mergers) (see Table 3 ). The wave didn't affect at the same extend all countries. Germany, Italy France, Spain, Luxemburg and UK had the largest reduction in the number of active banks (see Table 2 ). Especially, in Germany and Italy the percentage of financial market restructuring is very high (16.25% and 6.07% respectively).
Although the data used per se do not reveal the nature of these mergers, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) reveal that a small portion of merger activity involves transatlantic parties (bidders or targets). Even the majority of Intra-European activity is not cross border. On the contrary the majority of the merger activity in Europe (about 80%) is observed within national borders. "Fragmented and mostly domestically-oriented European companies resorted to takeover deals as a tool to survive the tougher regional competition created by the new market" (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006) . The finding of the two researchers strengthens the argument that the merger activity in Europe aimed at achieving competitive advantage, to create economies of scale and to obtain larger market share. Financially (see Table 4 ), the dissolved or merged banks presented a wide spectrum of values on the selected three ratios (Total Capital Ratio, Equity to Net Loans and Growth of Gross Loans). No pattern seems to present itself (eg. Low TCR values). A hypothesis is that there are market formulating factors that differ from country to country (eg. Growth of gross loans is quite different from country to country). Unknown 0,15% 0,00% 0,19% 0,00% 0,15% 0,00% 0,14% Total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
As expected, ownership is more dispersed in the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system. Only 5,33% of the banks have ownership concentration higher than 50,01%, whereas in the Continental Europe system ownership concentration above the threshold of 50.01% is 18.97% (see Table 6 ). This finding is in accordance with the one that Franks et el. (2008) reported (UK ownership concentration is 18%, Germany 43% and Italy 68%). On the other hand the difference of ownership concentration between North and South is also substantial. Countries that were ranked to the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system seem to have the majority of their banks to be controlled subsidiaries (77.51%). PIGSs' banks are very close to the average of every type of ownership 10 . Another important factor for the evolution of the financial sector is the corporate governance structure. Bankscope provides data about the committees working in every bank, through data given for the members of the board of directors. Using this information an index was constructed. The index of Good Corporate Governance Practices is calculated as the sum of the number of committees (remuneration, nomination, risk management, etc.). Table 7 presents the average of the Good Practice Index for every dimension of the study. The highest numbers are calculated for the banks which have a major controlling shareholder or they are controlled subsidiary. One finding worth mentioning is the high average for the Continental Europe corporate governance system (mainly because some committees are legally mandatory) whereas for the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system (voluntary adoption of good practices) the average of the index low.
In order to test the hypothesis that there was a change in financial management during the last eight (8) years, a number of ratios have been selected and calculated (see Table 8 ). NLTA's analysis shows that the banks of countries of the Continental Europe
10
Bankscope does not provide historical data for ownership. The only data given is for the last year of entry and can only be used to classify the sample and to make panels. corporate governance system have higher average than the ratios calculated for the Anglo-Saxon countries. Continental Europe countries' are more exposed to loan risk. There was no significant change through time. Hence, the legal, events (scandals) or other initiatives didn't have significant impact in improving this ratio, but it seems that has an impact on the GGL ratio. The ratio seems to be getting smaller through time. The banks reduced their loan growth, in order to maintain the level capitalization of their business.
The ratio ETA (Equity / Total Assets) in the Anglo-Saxon, South and PIGS countries is significantly higher than in the ones of the Continental Europe. The central Europe's economies have lower levels of ETA. The same can be said for the ENL, Tier and TCR ratios. Banks with higher ENL, ETA, Tier and TCR ratios are considered to be better situated to handle risks (operational, credit risk) and have better capital adequacy and they have lower levels of leverage. These ratios do not appear to change through time in every spatial dimension used in this paper.
Finally, the return ratios (ROA and REP) reveal significant differences between Anglo-Saxon and Continental Europe countries (the difference may be attributed to higher leverage levels in central Europe banks). All ratios do not appear to change through time in every spatial dimension used in this paper. Table 9 and 10 depict the way that Fitch ranked and approached the European financial market. On average the PIGS banks were ranked 14 times and ranked lower than Not PIGS banks. Furthermore, Fitch focused more on the Anglo-Saxon countries banks (15,29 average times). The fact of higher count of rankings can be explained by the interest of the market participants (due to more developed and efficient markets) and their total assets (22% of the total assets of the European banking sector). Overall, the countries that have a large banking sector (in terms of assets and equity) receive better rankings (see Table 10 ). 
Conclusions
The paper presented a description of the banking sector using three spatial and three time dimensions. The analysis showed that there are (still) significant differences among the countries or spatial dimensions. These differences didn't change through time. So, the convergence in Europe is still a challenge for the banking sector. Legal convergence failed to have the same effect on the financial and ownership structure of the banks. One finding that is significant is the high ownership concentration. The main reason is perhaps that "ownership concentration in banks remains a desirable internal regulatory mechanism" (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011, p. 12). Financially, capital adequacy and solvency didn't improve, despite the alarming events that took place during the last 10-12 years. Banks have become more restrained in their credit expansion (probably because they were obliged to do so, due to stricter regulation). There are no evidence of financial development or the possibility of reaching the previous levels of profitability and activity (see for example the GGL and ROA ratio).
The strategy during the last 6-8 years, although, seems to be different. The activity of mergers from 2008-2011 hasn't changed. In times of crises (whereas in the period of 1999-2002 the activity boomed) the banks chose a less riskier strategy, downsizing.
Further research The data collected is extensive and the hypothesis too provocative to be left to a descriptive analysis. Further research, in the form of econometric panel data models, is planned in order to establish the relations between the variables discussed in the current paper.
